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LIMITED-ACCESS HIGHWAYS AND PUBLIC
UTILITY USER
By

ROBERT P. GARBARINO t

THE

LOGICAL PLACE for electric wires and telephone wires, the
traditional place, has been parallel to the street and the highways;
perhaps in the city under the carriageway in a cable conduit; and in
the country on poles alongside the right of way. The use of the same
right of way for roads and for utilities minimizes injury to property
values, simplifies and reduces the cost of condemnation, and provides
ready access to utility installations for maintenance and repair. In less
degree there are similiar advantages for water and gas pipes. By and
large, the roads go where people will need utilities. By and large, the
routes most suitable for roads are most convenient for utilities, in
directness, in facility of construction, in obstacle avoidance, and in
service to the people to be benefited. The question this Article will treat
is the accommodation of the new limited-access highways to the traditional and logical public utility user. To what extent will utilities be
permitted to build on these highways and to use them for service of
their facilities?
The problem was raised sharply in recent hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Public Roads. Testifying before the Subcommittee with respect to the recently enacted Federal-Aid Highway Act,1
Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks expressed the view that unrestricted utility occupancy of the new highways is inconsistent with the
standards of access control upon which they are designed.
The Secretary spoke in terms of legislation, but it is anticipated that
federal action on this question will take the customary form of regulations issued by the Commerce Department, subject to the 30-day period
for objection and suggestion under the Administrative Procedure Act.2
At least it is clear that the Secretary has such power.'
Such new federal regulations would have an immediate and important impact on state regulation of highway user by utilities. The
t Member of the Philadelphia Bar, B.B.A., St. Bonaventure University, LL.B.,
Villanova University; First Editor-in-Chief of the Villanova Law Review, Assistant
Counsel for the Philadelphia Electric Company.
1. FDElRAL-AID HIGHWAY ACT oF 1958, PUB. L. No. 85-381.
2. 5 U.S.C. § 1003(a), (b) and (c) (1952).
3. 23 U.S.C. § 19, as amended, 23 U.S.C. § 156(e)

(1952).

(489)
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Commerce Department cannot control state regulations directly, but
it can require compliance as a condition of the federal grant, which
may run as high as 90 per cent of the construction cost and even higher
in states having public-owned lands.' And, it may be expected that the
regulations will follow and expand upon the Secretary's remarks.

It is the purpose of this article to investigate. the implications of
these remarks and to compare the results with existing state laws in
order to determine what amendments or additions to state law the
federal regulations might require.' The coverage will be nationwide,
with some emphasis on Pennsylvania as a typical state.
There are three types of statutes which are potentially controlling
on the question of utility user of public highways:
1. Comprehensive highway occupation and regulatory
schemes usually found in state constitutions and highway acts;
2. State enabling statutes accepting the conditions of federal
aid; and
3. Controlled-access highway legislation.
The various statutes will be examined in this order.
It should be kept in mind that state regulations more stringent than
the federal regulations need not be changed, unless the more liberal
federal rule is viewed for one reason or another as an affirmative mandate. In most cases this latter problem will not arise since the question
will be only whether existing state laws can satisfy the federal conditions without amendment or supplement.
The reader may be unfamiliar with the legal status of our highway
system.' The United States has no national system such as is often
found in other countries. The only roads built and maintained wholly
by the federal government are some 70,000 miles of national forest,
national park, and Indian reservation roads. All the rest of our roads
are owned and maintained either by the states or by political subdivisions of the states.
Some important roads and streets bear the "U. S." shield, but this
is only a national numbering device for the convenience of travelers
rather than an indication of exclusive federal maintenance or ownership.
4. 23 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1952).
5. This article will not examine the equally important and allied question of state
and federal laws governing reimbursement for utility relocation costs occasioned by
highway improvements. For example, see 23 U.S.C. § 162 (1952).
6. For a comprehensive and informative analysis of this subject, see TYLR,
AMERICAN HIGHwAYs TODAY (1957), Vol. 29, No. 1 of The Reference Shelf.
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The federal government does give aid for state highways. The
federal-aid system divides state highways into four classes: the primary
system, including the more important rural highways; the secondary
or farm-to-market roads; the urban system which is made up primarily
of city streets which connect to state highway routes either passing
through or adjacent to the cities and are extensions of the primary and
secondary roads within urban areas; and the class with which this article
is concerned, the National System of Interstate Highways, which are
part of the primary system and whose routes are selected jointly by
the states and by the Bureau of Roads of the Commerce Department.
The Interstate System covers only one and two-tenths per cent of our
highways, but it embraces substantially all the heavily-traveled, highspeed highways, and these are the highways with which Secretary
Weeks' remarks were concerned, because of the safety and convenience
problems they raise. 7 The need for regulating utility installations along
other roads is much less, and the discussion here is not meant to be
applied to them.
The question of utility occupancy of highways posed few problems
for either highway planners or utilities until recent years. The first
important controlled-access highway was the 1939 western section of
the Pennsylvania Turnpike. Before the limited-access principle could
be widely adopted, the war intervened and terminated new-highway
construction for the duration. But.with the end of the war it was widely
felt that a gigantic national highway program was needed to meet the
strain to be placed on the neglected existing highways by the tremendous
demand for new, bigger and faster automobiles. The emphasis was
not on local service roads but on high-speed through highways incorporating new design and construction features. Automobile registrations increased from thirty-two million in 1940 to approximately sixtyseven million in 1957.
The controlled-access principle was soon widely accepted. 8 Studies
showed that accidents could be reduced though speeds were raised. But
this meant that intersecting streets, driveways, and railroad crossings
must be eliminated. Traffic must be gradually channelled on and off
the roadway at a limited number of ingress and egress points. And,
"ribbon development," ' roadside hot dog stands, motels, miniature golf
courses, and the like must be barred.
7. Ibid.
8. LEVIN, PUBLIC CONTROL OF HIGHWAY ACCESS AND ROADSIDE DEVELOPMENT
1-98 (1947).
9. I& at 90; HUBER, CONTROL OF ACCESS TO ROADS AND STREETS 96-102 (1955),
Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual Highway Conference, Grand Rapids, Michigan.
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At first there was no effort to exclude utility facilities since they
were not the source of the basic problem. In many areas, utilities removed their parallel poles and substituted underground installations.10
However the installations continued to be located longitudinally along
the roads outside the shoulder areas, and the utilities continued to use
the roads to service these installations.
It was with this aspect of occupancy that the Secretary took issue.
He felt that, on roads with speeds ranging from fifty miles per hour in
urban and mountainous areas to sixty in rolling country to seventy in
flat country, even this limited amount of conflict was hazardous. He
took the position that the use of the main roadway as a service road
involved the same dangers as the use of a driveway along the road.
However, he did recognize that these service trucks are performing a
public function while the private car in the driveway is not.
Are the existing Commerce Department regulations adequate to
the new neeeds? The answer is no; new regulations are needed. The
only applicable ones implement two provisions of the federal highway
law 11 to the effect that the rights of way for federal-aid highways shall
be exclusively for highways and that no signs, other than traffic signs,
no billboards, roadside stands or other private installation for serving
the motorist shall be permitted within the right-of-way limits. Such
provisions are obviously addressed to "ribbon development" and were
neither intended by Congress nor construed by the Department to apply
to utility facilities.
Each state had regulatory provisions which they adopted to their
own particular situations. However, when the new thinking with respect to design standards became the order of the day some states looked
to these federal provisions and interpreted them as being applicable, and
ascribed to the Department a position which could hardly be sustained
on either the state or federal level. Other states, recognizing that the
existing federal regulations were inapplicable, simply utilized their customary state regulations. In a word, regulation of utility installations
differed from state to state. Visualizing the need for standardization
and a fixed policy geared to 1975 requirements, as well as the public
need for utilities, the Secretary has made the following proposal:
"I also feel that Congress should give consideration to the
problem of whether and the extent to which utility facilities should
be permitted to occupy the rights-of-way of highways on the
10. There are no poles along the Pennsylvania Turnpike, but utility facilities are
located in the off-shoulder areas and cross the pike without causing any safety hazards
over the years in which they have been so located. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36,

§625(1) (1952).
11. 23 U.S.C. § 163; 23 FED. R a. 387, 390 (1951).
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Interstate System. The geometric and construction standards
adopted for the Interstate System provide for highway design
speeds of at least 70 miles per hour for flat terrain, 60 miles per
hour for rolling terrain, and 50 miles per hour in mountainous and
urban areas. The standards provide for control of access, complete
elimination of railroad grade crossings, and the elimination of
virtually all other crossings and intersections as well as other provisions deemed essential for the safe, efficient, and rapid movement
of traffic. The installation of utility facilities within the rights-ofway of highways constructed to such standards, and particularly the
utilization of the main traveled way of such highways as a service
road for the installation, maintenance and repair of utility facilities
are inconsistent with the purposes for which such standards were
adopted. We have given considerable thought to this problem
recently, and feel strongly that a policy should be adopted which
would preserve the safety features contemplated for the Interstate
System, and at the same time to make such necessary provisions
for the utilities as are not inconsistent with this objective. We are
now considering the preparation of draft legislation on this subject." 12
In the light of this statement it would appear that any proposed
regulations enacted within that policy framework would proceed along
the following lines:
1. They would apply only to the Interstate System and would
be prospective.
2. They would be geared primarily to prohibitions against
utilization of the main traveled portion of the roadway as a service
road for adjacent utility facilities.
t 3. They would recognize the need for utility installation in
the right-of-way to some reasonable extent in order to carry out
their statutory duty to serve the public.
4. They would limit this occupancy to the extent that it would
conflict with the future design standards of access control of the
Interstate System.
5. They would apparently permit underground and overhead
crossing of the Interstate System so long as such facilities could
be serviced from manholes outside the roadway and without utilizing the roadway as a service road.
6. They would permit the servicing of traffic lights and street
lighting from the main traveled way.
7. Utility facilities such as poles paralleling the roadway and
constituting adjacent obstacles to passing traffic would be pro12. Hearings before Subcommittee on Public Roads, on S. 2939, S. 3033, S. 3088,
S. 3150, S. 3220, S. 3414, and S. 3429, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. at 5 (1958).
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hibited. (This has frequently been required in toll road and parkway construction by the states.)
8. Utility facilities located within the right-of-way but outside
the shoulder area which could be serviced from parallel roads
other than the main roadway would not appear to conflict with
access control and hence would probably be permitted. To prohibit this sort of occupancy would be tantamount to complete exclusion and hence raise serious legal questions at both the state
and federal level.
Finally, although no mention of this was made by the Secretary, it would appear that some sort of provision will have to be
made for the "hard case" where the main way must be utilized as
a service road if adequate utility service to customers is to be rendered. Again, this would avoid any questions of unreasonableness.
In the light of this prognosis, the three primary types of potentially
applicable legislation and constitutional provisions will be examined.
I.
COMPREHENSIVE

HIGHWAY OCCUPATION AND REGULATORY

PROVISIONS.

Of the three types of state law here involved this type is the oldest
and best established. It dates back to the 1800's when the utility era
began. The enabling provisions for utility installations take either the
form of constitutional provisions or statutes or both. Every state of
the union as well as the District of Columbia, Hawaii and Puerto Rico
has made some statutory provision for the installation of utility facilities
in its primary system of state highways.' 8 In addition, constitutional
provisions relating to this same subject are found in eighteen states.' 4
With the exception of Oklahoma all of these constitutional provisions provide for utility installations in the streets and highways of
the state in general, rather than limiting that right to state highways.
This is perfectly logical when it is realized that most of these constitutional provisions were enacted before anyone gave any serious consideration to the designation of highway types, and before the advent
of the first state highway departments. All eighteen of these constitutional enactments provide for street railway occupancy, and nine of
them provide for this type of utility only. Hence, in the latter cases
non-rail utilities must look to statutory provisions for their right to
enter upon the streets and highways with their facilities.
13. See

HIGHWAY

RESEARCH BOARD SPECIAL REPORT

21,

RELOCATION OF PU3LIC

UTILITIES DUE To HIGHWAY IMPROVEMENT, at 41-84, and Appendix A

(1955).

The

Appendix of this report provides citations and text of all state laws.
14. Id. at Appendix A.
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Most of these constitutional provisions have a regulatory feature
attached to them with respect to initial occupancy, which requires the
consent of the local governing body, rather than the state, prior to installation. Typically the cases construing such provisions have held that
such consent may be withheld only because of conditions affecting public
health, safety and welfare, and not for revenue-raising or exclusionary
purposes.1" Consequently, any arbitrary or capricious withholding of
consent is not condoned, and this power which at first sight would
appear to be plenary, and hence could easily meet any federal conditions,
is not so broad in the clear light of the decisions. And correctly so.
How incongruous it would be to empower the utilities to utilize the
streets and highways to serve the public and then in the same statutory
or constitutional breath give a local political subdivision or the state
the power to exclude them on the basis of unreasonable conditions attached to the grant of consent.
The courts recognizing these considerations set up a standard for
the grant or refusal of consent based on the police power-which is
really the elastic balancing of equities rule which recognizes the rights
of the public as utility service consumers and as highway users, and
thus can be easily adjusted to new conditions. In Michigan and Oklahoma the consent condition is broader and extends beyond the initial
occupancy and provides that control over streets and highways shall
remain with the appropriate governmental authority. Thus, in these
two states the enabling constitutional provisions themselves provide for
a method of regulation at the time of installation as well as continued
regulation after initial installation.
The same general pattern of regulatory power is followed in the
statutory enabling acts. In other words, there are reasonable consent
provisions attached to initial occupancy as well as regulatory powers
attaching after the initial consent has been granted and the facilities
installed. For example, thirty-seven states provide that consent of the

proper authority, usually the local political subdivision or the state highway department, must be obtained prior to occupying the highway rightof-way, at least with respect to certain specific types of utilities. 6 In
addition every state has made provision for reasonable regulation of
utility facility locations after initial installation, at least with respect to
specifically enumerated classes of utilities." In general, virtually every
15. For example, see Central District & Printing Telegraph Co. v. Homer City,
242 Pa. 597, 89 Atl. 681 (1914) ; Dorrance v. Bristol Borough, 224 Pa. 464, 73 Atl.
1015 (1909) ; Farmers' Mutual Telephone Co. v. Middleboro Borough, 25 Pa. Dist.
Rep. 256 (C.P., Erie 1916).
16. See note 13 supra at Appendix A.
17. Id.
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type of utility is covered by this variety of legislation. The typical
phrase is that either all or certain specified utilities may occupy the high-

way "so long as they do not incommode the public use of the road or
highway."

18

A few of the states however, such as Arizona and Arkansas, although falling within the "incommode" group with respect to certain
types of utilities, permit the occupation of highway rights-of-way by certain other utilities without imposing any restrictions whatsoever.1 9 This,
however, is the unusual case and normally the "incommode" provisions
are applicable to all utilities and tested by the balancing of equities,
police power standard.
Thus, we may conclude that under one form of enactment or
another (constitutional or statutory) all utilities are permitted to enter

upon the streets and highways of the states with their facilities to varying degrees; and, with rare exceptions, all utilities are subject to
reasonable regulation upon initial occupancy by virtue of the consent
provisions, and after initial installation by virtue of the "incommode"
provisions.

In addition, most of the states have additional provisions

addressed to the type of facility rather than to the type of utility, requiring permits prior to crossing highways and breaking the pavement
and giving the appropriate body the right to attach reasonable conditions
based on questions of health, safety and public welfare, but excluding
revenue-producing or confiscatory measures in the granting of these
permits.2"
This brings us to the important question of adaptation without
amendment or supplement of these several classes of enactments to new
federal regulations. The rule of reason which has been grafted to the
consent provisions and the permit and "incommode" provisions is obviously highly elastic and hence easily adaptable to new situations and
new problems. In each case the everyday application of this flexible
standard involves a balancing of equities, between the utilities and the
public road users. The greater the burden placed upon the utility and
the smaller the public benefit the more likely the particular condition
will be declared invalid. On the other hand, the greater the public
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Plattsmouth v. Nebraska Tel. Co., 80 Neb. 460, 114 N.W. 588 (1908) ; Valley
Railways v. Harrisburg, 280 Pa. 385, 124 Atil. 644 (1924) ; Allegheny County Light
Co. v. Booth, 216 Pa. 564, 66 Atl. 72 (1907); Hestonville, Mantua & Fairmount
Passenger Railroad Co. v. Philadelphia, 89 Pa. 210 (1879) ; Edgewood Borough v.
Scott, 29 Pa. Super. 156 (1905) ; Ridley Park v. Light and Power Co., 9 Pa. Super.
615 (1899) ; Pennsylvania ex rel. Bard v. Philadelphia Electric Co., Equity No. 3,
September Term (Mont. 1938) ; State v. Benwood & McMechen Water Co., 94
W. Va. 724, 120 S.E. 918 (1923).
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benefit and the less the burden the more likely the regulation will be
held valid. In all cases the regulation will have to be for health, safety
or public welfare purposes and will recognize the primary "easement"
of travel.
Applying this reasoning to the regulations predicted by the writer
it would appear that there is ample basis within these elastic provisions
for adjustment to the federal conditions without any changes in state
law. More than likely the only changes will be policy changes or
changes in state regulations enacted under these provisions which will
reflect compliance with the new federal conditions. Of course, this is
predicated on the assumption that there will be no blanket exclusion
from the off-shoulder right-of-way area when access can be obtained
from other than the main way, as well as provision for "hard cases."
Since the application of the new conditions appears to be prospective
there is no problem of retroactivity. 21 With respect to the removal of
parallel poles there is already case law authority sustaining such regulation in given situations, such as along city streets, where the danger to
public safety is great.22 In view of the high speeds anticipated on the
Interstate System and the frequency with which utility poles are struck
at present, it seems that such a regulation would be declared valid under
the rule of reason. In fact, the utilities would probably agree with the
imposition of this condition wholeheartedly except in unusual circumstances. With respect to the question of using the main way as a
service road to off-shoulder facilities, such as high tension lines, the
question is much closer. However, as long as some provision is made
for the "hard cases" where there is no place to locate the facilities other
than adjacent to the main way and where the only possible service entrance is from the main way, the federal prohibition could probably be
accommodated under the noted test.
The "hard cases" are well illustrated by two vivid and not unusual
examples. In Pennsylvania the new Section Nine portion of the Schuylkill Expressway, which is a part of the Interstate System, passes through
the heart of urban Philadelphia. In the vicinity of Thirtieth Street the
topography is as follows: On the west are the tracks of the Pennsylvania
21. Plattsmouth v. Nebraska Tel. Co., 80 Neb. 460, 114 N.W. 588 (1908);
Hedrick v. Graham, 96 S.E.2d 129 (N.C. 1957) ; Breinig v. Allegheny County, 332
Pa. 474, 2 A.2d 842 (1938) ; United Electric Light Co. v. East Pittsburgh, 230 Pa.
65, 79 At. 229 (1911) ; Allegheny County Light Co. v. Booth, 216 Pa. 564, 79 Atd.

229 (1907); Consolidated Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania v. Wilkes-Barre, 34 C.C.
177 (Luz. 1907).
22. Duquesne Light Co. v. Pittsburgh, 251 Pa. 557, 97 Atl. 85 (1916) ; Pennsylvania ex rel. Bard v. Philadelphia Electric Co., Equity No. 3, September Term

(Mont. 1938).

But see Carver v. State, 11 Ga. App. 22, 74 S.E. 556 (1912) ; Platts-

mouth v. Nebraska Tel. Co., 80 Neb. 460, 114 N.W. 588 (1908) ; A.T. & T. Co. of
Pennsylvania v. Mifflintown Borough, 15 D & C 575 (C. P. Jun. 1930).
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Railroad Company's Thirtieth Street Station. Immediately adjacent is
the new roadway which parallels the tracks so closely that the construction of the expressway required the relocation of many of the supports
for the railway electrification wires. To the east of the roadway is the
Schuylkill River. The river is so close to the roadway that in some
places the Expressway extends over the water's edge on cement piers.
Obviously, the only way in which to service utility facilities located in
this area is from the traveled way. To refuse access in such cases
would appear to be unreasonable and hence it is doubtful that the proposed rules would not make provision for such a situation.
To complicate the situation further, in Pennsylvania utilities have
the power to condemn only up to a point not less than three hundred
In an urban area this means that there
feet from the dwelling house."
is no effective power of condemnation. In addition, even if the power
to condemn were present the costs in such a heavily populated, high cost
area would be prohibitive.
Another example is typical of a situation which arises in a completely different setting. Here there is an abundance of land but the
terrain is one of tremendous canyons bottomed by fast-moving rivers;
the State of Colorado is a good example of such land. Anyone who has
traveled in that area has seen how the high tension lines are constructed
on the sides of sheer cliffs. Naturally on such terrain the highway and
the utility installation both take the path of least resistance. Obviously,
in such cases the main way must often be utilized for servicing purposes.
To deny the utility that right in such cases is tantamount to a denial of
utility service to customers in such areas. Again, it would be surprising
if provision were not made for such situations in the proposed regulations. With that provision, as well as with the provision for installation in off-shoulder areas not serviced from the main roadway,
there would then be no serious problem in adjusting existing state
constitutional and statutory, comprehensive, highway-occupation
schemes to the new regulations without amendment or supplement.
With that background in mind the Pennsylvania scheme and the
cases construing it will be examined in detail, again from the standpoint
of adjusting to the proposed federal policy already enunciated.
The Pennsylvania scheme follows the usual pattern but differs in
some important details. In Pennsylvania there is no constitutional
provision for occupancy nor is there any blanket enabling statute pro23. Electric utilities, for example, are given the power to condemn "except that
a dwelling house or the reasonable curtilage, not to be less than three hundred
feet, appurtenant thereto, shall not be appropriated.... . PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1182(b) ; Charch v. Pennsylvania P.U.C., 183 Pa. Super. 371, 132 A.2d 894 (1957).
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viding for all utilities. On the contrary, there are a host of individual
enabling acts, dating back as far as 1857, covering the several types
of utilities.24 However, these statutes are virtually identical with
respect to the powers conferred and the express limitations on such
powers. "5
Pennsylvania, following the usual pattern, has both an initial consent feature and an "incommode" feature. It differs, however, in this
respect. The consent feature, which is a part of the enabling acts, does
not apply to all installations. It is only applicable to installations in
the streets and highways of boroughs and cities. The consent feature
does not apply to state highways. The state has been given the power
under a subject-matter statute to require permits prior to the making of
any opening or crossing of any state highway, as well as the power to
The Highway Deattach reasonable conditions to the grant thereof.2
partment further has been given this same power by statute with respect
to second-class township roads with the latter receiving a part of the
27
permit fee bearing a reasonable relation to the cost of inspection.
The first-class townships have a power similar to the Departments with
respect to its streets on the basis of their statutory police-power grants.2 8
Together with their initial consent powers the cities and boroughs also
have well-established, post-installation, regulatory powers based on their
24. For example, Water (1857), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1332 (1958) ; Gas
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1331 (1958) ; Telephone and Telegraph (1874),
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2292 (1958); Electric (1874), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,

(1857),
PA.

§ 1181 (1958).

15, § 1181 (1958), is typical
25. The Electric Enabling Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
and provides:
"Companies incorporated under the provisions of this act, for the supply of
light, heat and power, or any of them, to the public by electricity shall from the
date of the letters patent creating the same, have the powers and be governed,
managed and controlled as follows:
"Every such corporation shall have the authority to supply light, heat and
power, or any of them, by electricity, to the public . . . at such prices as may
be agreed upon, and the power also, to make, erect and maintain the necessary
buildings, machinery and apparatus for supplying such light, heat and power or
any of them, and to distribute the same, with the right to enter upon any public
street, lane, alley or highway for such purpose, to alter, inspect and repair its
system of distribution. .. "
And the consent feature provides:
"that no company which may be incorporated under the provisions of this act
shall enter upon any street in any city or borough of this commonwealth until
after the consent to such entry, of the councils of the city or borough in which
such street may be located, shall have been obtained."
26. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 670-411 (1958) ; Commonwealth v. Funk, 323 Pa.
390, 186 Atl. 65 (1936) ; Philadelphia Suburban Water Co. v. Pennsylvania P.U.C.,
168 Pa. Super. 360, 78 A.2d 46 (1951).
27. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 66156 (Supp. 1958). See Robinson Twp. v. The
Bell Telephone Co., 61 D & C 483 (C.P. Ally. 1947).
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 56557 and 57084 (1957).
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respective police-power grants."
In addition, the courts by judicial
decision have added an "incommode" provision to all of the alreadymentioned powers.8"
There is considerable case law touching each of these provisions
and essentially it amounts to this: the rule of reason guided by a
balancing of equities controls in all cases. The applicable law has been
well stated by Mr. Justice Stewart when he said in Central Distributing
& Printing Telegraph Co. v. Homer City Borough:
On consent:
. . .the legislature did not contemplate that such consent would
be withheld except for conditions affecting the public welfare. Any
arbitrary or capricious withholding of its consent by borough authorities would not be justified."
And on regulations and conditions attached to consent:
"So too with respect to the imposition of conditions and regulations
by the borough. If any be imposed, the law contemplates that
they shall be reasonable and not arbitrarily imposed simply with
the view to defeat their acceptance by the applying company."
Although that particular case dealt with a borough the same rules
have been applied to state regulations on the theory that while the Commonwealth has changed its highway trustee from the smaller political
subdivisions to the State Highway Department With respect to certain
highways by taking back in 1911 many of the powers formerly conferred
32
on the former, it did not alter the powers of the designated trustee.
Accordingly, city, borough and county cases are cited interchangeably
in State Highway Department decisions. 3
Hence, it is clear that the city and borough powers are grounded
on the consent provisions of the several enabling acts and the statutory
grant of police powers, and limited in scope by the police power rule of
reason. The state's power, on the other hand, stems from its plenary
29. Allegheny County Light Co. v. Booth, 216 Pa. 564, 66 Atl. 72 (1907) ; A.T. &
T. of Pennsylvania v. Mifflintown Borough, 15 D & C 575 (C.P. Jun. 1930).
30. Peoples Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Turnpike Road, 199 Pa. 411, 49 Atl.

284 (1901).
31. 242 Pa. 597, 89 Atl. 681 (1914).
32. Breinig v. Allegheny County, 332 Pa. 474, 2 A.2d 842 (1938) ; Bell Telephone
Co. v. Lewis, 317 Pa. 387, 177 Atl. 36 (1935) ; Westmoreland Chemical & Color Co.
v. Public Service Commission, 294 Pa. 451, 144 Atl. 407 (1928); Commonwealth
ex rel. Reno v. Heidelberg Twp. Water Co., 48 D & C 511 (C.P. Dauph. 1943).
33. See, for examples, Dept. of Highways v. Pennsylvania P.U.C., 185 Pa. Super.

1, 136 A.2d 473 (1957), appeal allowed on other grounds; Commonwealth ex rel.
Reno v. Heidelberg Twp. Water Co., 48 D & C 511, 517-519 (C.P. Dauph. 1943).
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control over the highways as parens patriae and the police power. 4 Its
powers are circumscribed by the statutory exercise of these powers and
the statute itself is limited by the permissible scope of the police power.
In other words the statutory exercise may be less than the permissible
scope of the police power but never greater.
The "incommode" feature was first introduced in a 1901 decision. 5
In that case a utility had erected its poles along a turnpike road pursuant
to its statutory authority. The turnpike company proceeded to cut
down the poles and the utility sought an injunction. In granting the
injunction, the court stated:
"Nothing is better established than that a turnpike road is a
public highway, and every traveller has the same right to use it
upon payment of the toll established by law as he would have to
use any other public highway.
"The plaintiff company, therefore is authorized under the laws
of the commonwealth to locate and construct a telephone line on
the public highway . . ., and if located and constructed so as
not to incommode the public use of said highway; the defendant
company cannot be permitted to interfere with plaintiff in its
constructed and operation as threatened."
This same principle has been affirmed as recently as 1957 in Department of Highways v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission 36
where the court stated:
"It has long been the policy of this Commonwealth, and most
other states, to permit public utility companies to place their facilities upon highway rights-of-way, so long as such facilities do not
interfere with the public use of the highways. See Bell Telephone
Company of Pennsylvania v. Lewis, 317 Pa. 387, 177 A. 36
(1935). Use of the streets by the public utility companies is subject to the earlier and superior rights of the public. It has been
held that the police power to control and regulate the highways
so as to protect the public health and safety is one that cannot be
bargained away by legislation or municipal grant. Such authority
is both paramount and inalienable. Scranton Gas and Water Co.
v. Scranton, 214 Pa. 586, 590, 591, 64 Atl. 84 (1906)."
(Emphasis added.)
It is noteworthy that of the two cases cited in this quotation one
involved State Highway Department powers and the other dealt with
city powers and yet both were applied without distinction, in the cus34. Commonwealth v. Funk, 323 Pa. 390, 186 At. 65 (1936).
35. Peoples Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Turnpike Road, 199 Pa. 411, 415, 49

Atl. 284 (1901).
36. 185 Pa. Super. 1, 136 A.2d 473 (1957).
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tomary manner in Pennsylvania. Further note that the police regulatory powers held by the state are based on public health and safety and
therefore any revenue-raising measures would not be tolerated. 7 When
regulations are imposed, or conditions attached to the grant of permits
they must be reasonable and related to the public health and safety."
Thus, it can be seen that the rule of reason which is applicable to all
of these limitations on utility installations, the consent, regulatory and
"incommode" features, is applied in the following manner in this state. 9
(1) Is the regulatory purpose related to the health and safety
of the public?
(2) Do the means chosen bear a reasonable relation to the
object sought to be accomplished?
(3) Is there a clearly less burdensome way of accomplishing
the same result? In considering this factor the courts weigh the
magnitude of the evil against the burden imposed.
Accordingly, the Pennsylvania courts have held that a city or
borough cannot attach a provision for free lighting to its consent, since
such a requirement has no relation to health, safety or public welfare.4"
Further, while reasonable permit and inspection fees may be attached
to the grant of consent, the fee must bear a proper relation to the
reasonable cost of inspection.4 ' On the other hand, the requiring of
street permits prior to installation or repair has been invariably sanctioned ' provided no unreasonable conditions are attached to the grant
of the permit.48 Further, in the interest of public safety reasonable
restrictions may be imposed with respect to the situs of pole installations
in the highways and streets." And in urban areas where the safety
hazards are great, the courts have sanctioned orders requiring underground installations and the removal of all poles and overhead wires.48
37. Taylor Borough v. Postal Telegraph & Cable Co., 192 U.S. 64 (1904);
Kittanning Borough v. Kittanning Consolidated Gas Co., 26 Pa. Super. 355 (1904).
38. See note 29 supra.
39. Gambone v. Commonwealth, 375 Pa. 547, 101 A.2d 634 (1954). In that case
Chief Justice Stern clearly set forth the test applied to police power cases in Pennsylvania.
40. Scranton Electric Light & Heat Co. v. Scranton, 1 Lack. Jur. 177 (C.P. Pa.

1889).

41. Edgewood Borough v. Scott, 29 Pa. Super. 156 (1905); Ridley Park v.
Light & Power Co., 9 Pa. Super. 615 (1899).
42. Lansdowne Borough v. Springfield Water Co., 16 Pa. Super. 490, 496 (1901).
43. Central District & Printing Telegraph Co. v. Homer City, 242 Pa. 597, 89
Atl. 681 (1914).
44. A.T. & T. Co. of Pennsylvania v. Mill Creek Twp., 195 Pa. 643, 46 Atl.

140 (1900).

45. Compare Duquesne Light Co. v. Pittsburgh, 251 Pa. 557, 97 AtI. 85 (1916)

with A.T. & T. Co. of Pennsylvania v. Mifflintown Borough, 15 D & C 575 (C.P.
June 1930).
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However, the courts have held with equal vigor in Pennsylvania,
that a municipality may not, under the guise of regulation, deprive a
utility of its franchise to maintain an overhead line along a particular
street, offering as a substitute therefor the choice of several alternate
routes, any one of which would involve heavy expense, the acquisition
of rights-of-way over private property, and serious structural and engineering difficulties. 6 Using the same reasoning the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania invalidated an ordinance prohibiting the movement of
northbound traffic, including street cars, on a city street in order to
avoid congestion and danger, under the balancing of equities test.47 In
so holding the Court stated that "the power to regulate is not the power
to destroy. A limitation is not the equivalent of confiscation." Finally
the Pennsylvania courts have refused to uphold a flat prohibition against
access from an abutting drive to a county road when the burden imposed upon the abutting property owner was great and the safety features
slight in comparison to the burden."
The court in so holding recognized, however, that in the interest of public safety reasonable regulalations with respect to access from this property other than the prohibitory type invalidated might be sustained.
In the light of these cases it is obvious that the proposed federal
regulations could run into problems in Pennsylvania, at least under this
legislative scheme, unless some provision is made for off-shoulder installations serviced from roads other than the main roadway, and service
from the main way when the "hard case" is presented. However, with
such provisions the Pennsylvania scheme would appear to be adaptable
to the new changes without any amendments or supplements or new
decisional law. No doubt new regulations would be adopted at the
state level which would contemplate these changes without any amendment to the basic laws.
For example, it would appear that, except for the "hard case," telephone poles might be removed from the shoulder areas on interstate
highways without any great legal difficulties. Considering the high
speeds and consequent danger to the motorists, as contrasted to the
inconvenience of locating them off the shoulder, it would appear that
this provision would be upheld except in unusual circumstances. The
same thinking would apply for the provision against indiscriminate
access. In some cases an exception might have to be made under
controlled conditions-for example, permitting access at specific times
46. A.T. & T. Co. of Pennsylvania v. Mifflintown Borough, 15 D & C 575

(C.P. Jun. 1930).
47. Valley Railways v. Harrisburg, 280 Pa. 385, 124 At. 644 (1924).
48. Breining v. Allegheny County, 332 Pa. 474, 2 A.2d 842 (1938).
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Both of these regulations gain

added stature if installations are permitted along the off-shoulder areas
with access points from roads other than the primary roadway. This
makes the utilities' burden less severe without creating any appreciable
hazard to the motorist.
Thus, on the basis of this nationwide group survey and from the
specific examination of Pennsylvania law, it can be seen that any new
regulations along the suggested lines, as qualified, could be satisfied by
the several states within the framework of existing laws.
II.
ACCEPTANCE OF FEDERAL-AID PROVISIONS.

Every state has enacted legislation of one sort or other accepting
the fruits, as well as the required conditions, of federal aid.49 Funda-

mentally, the language of all these statutes is essentially the same though
they can be broken down into three distinct groups, with some states
passing more comprehensive and detailed acts than others. However,
an analysis of these statutes reveals that even the less detailed ones
are fully adequate to meet any reasonableconditions attached to federal
aid.
The more detailed pronouncements, which have been enacted in
the majority of states, contain the following four provisions: °
1. A formal assent is given to the receipt of federal aid under
the 1916 law, and a continuing assent is given to all future federalaid laws;
2. A designated administrative head, usually the Highway
Engineer, is given the power to enter into contracts with the
federal government to effectuate such grants in aid;
3. The administrator is given the power to do all things
necessary to obtain the benefits of federal aid, including compliance
with any conditions, rules or regulations attached thereto, and including the power to enact rules and regulations to satisfy any
such conditions;
4. The state's good faith is pledged to provide sufficient funds
to meet the requirements of federal aid.
49. See

APPENDIX A of this Article for all state statutes dealing with this

question.

50. Appendix A: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming.
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There is a little doubt that if ever legislation was designed to meet
any and all reasonablefederal regulations attached to grants-in-aid, this
legislation is so designed. And if anything more specific could be desired it is found in the second group typified by the California, Georgia
and Rhode Island statutes." The California and Georgia acts provide
that federal law is to govern in case of conflict, and that any inconsistency in state law with federal laws, rules or regulations will render
the state law inapplicable to that extent. The Rhode Island statute
provides that the provisions of state law concerning the building, improvement and maintenance of state roads and bridges is not to be
construed in any manner as to prevent the receipt of federal aid. However, it might be noted that no court would interpret these statutes so
as to permit these states to blindly follow any and all federal regulations
but would require them to be reasonable.
The Pennsylvania statute deviates somewhat from this pattern and
provides that the continuing assent shall not diminish any powers conferred on the State Highway Department.5 2 However, on closer examination, the Pennsylvania statute also is specifically available as a basis
for meeting reasonable new federal regulations. This provision is part
of the State Highway Act and was enacted at the same time as the
most recent amendment to the subject-matter provision for utility
regulation on state highways. Therefore, the Legislature intended this
assent section to be available as a basis for satisfying federal regulations
so long as this did not diminish any powers conferred in the utility
regulation section. Since the utility regulation section gives the State
Highway Department the power to attach reasonable conditions to the
installation and maintenance of utility facilities, it is obvious that the
two provisions are complementary and in full accord.
Although part of the majority group, the Arizona and Indiana
statutes "53 are worthy of specific mention because each contains an additional feature not found in the other states comprising this group. As
noted earlier, Arizona permits certain specified utilities to occupy its
streets and highways "without limitation." It was pointed out that
this might pose an obstacle to the use of enabling acts and regulatory
legislation as a basis for complying with federal regulations. However,
as a part of the federal assent portion of Arizona law the State Engineer
is given power to prescribe rules and regulations to govern the use of
state highways in the interest of public safety and convenience. This
51. See

APPENDIX

A.

52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1958

17

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 4 [1958], Art. 4

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

3: p. 489

proviso would appear to cast aside any fears and bring Arizona into
the fold with the rest of the states.
Indiana, in addition to being part of the majority which have
enacted the four-pronged assent legislation already discussed, had added
a further provision. 4 It gives the administrator the usual power to
cooperate with the federal government, but only "to the full extent
allowed by the Constitution of Indiana and not prohibited by law." At
the outset this might appear to be restrictive but in reality it is simply
saying specifically what the courts no doubt would say by decision in
other states, at least to the extent that the federal conditions being
assented to must be reasonable. Further, when it is recognized that
Indiana, like Pennsylvania, has a subject-matter permit and regulation
statute providing for reasonable regulation,55 that state will have no
problem harmonizing its assent provision to state law and thus utilizing
it as a method of complying with any reasonable federal regulations.
Finally, more limited and less comprehensive assent provisions are
found in a small group of states. The statutes are short, and simply
provide a continuing assent to federal-aid acts, and in some cases also
give the designated administrator the power to enter into contracts with
the federal government to effectuate such aid. Such statutes are in
effect in Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York and Oklahoma.5 6 However, though less specific, these statutes
can also be utilized for regulation purposes. They all clearly assent
to the federal-aid acts, and the requirement of compliance with attached
conditions is a part of these acts. Further, the ability to enter into
contracts to effectuate such aid contemplates the power to satisfy any
reasonable conditions attached to all such contracts.
Thus, in the absence of a violation of special state constitutional
or statutory provisions, such as notice requirements in titles or prohibitions against implied amendmnent, these statutes constitute a panacea
for meeting the requirements of the proposed federal regulations. They
clearly constitute the most desirable method of meeting new standards.
Although the more comprehensive enabling-act provisions and regulatory schemes are specifically addressed to utility occupancy and have
formed the basis for state regulation in the past, they are basically a
hodge-podge of individually enacted statutes involving constant overlapping and inconsistencies. True, when the entire conglomeration is
thrown into the "pot" and boiled it simmers down to a right of occupancy for all utilities subject to reasonable regulation. However, it
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
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requires a great deal of boiling first. Hence, in applying these suggested
regulations to particular situations the court would have to examine
the particular enabling act, the restrictions imposed thereon and the
applicable case law.
On the other hand the assent provisions are the only state acts
specifically addressed to the question of satisfying federal-aid conditions.
Under these statutes the courts would simply have to look at one statute
and decide if the legislature intended that its provisions should apply
to utility occupancy in the light of the franchise grants and regulatory
provisions pertaining to them specifically, and if so, whether the state
compliance was reasonable. That is the issue which would be presented
in each state, although the answer to the first part of the issue would
be rather obvious in California, Georgia and Rhode Island. If they
were found to be applicable it would be a desirable result from the
standpoint of expediency since the one statute would cover all utilities
and would be completely elastic and adjustable to any future changes
in federal requirements. Other than the issue noted the only other
objection to their utilization by the individual states might be on constitutional grounds. Frequently found in state constitutions are provisions prohibiting the concealment of veiled subject matter in the body
of a statute which is not set forth in the title and provisions barring the
inclusion of more than one subject matter in a single statute. 7 In
addition there is an ,abundance of case law to the effect that in construing statutes, amendment by implication of important legislation will
never be permitted unless there is no other reasonable hypothesis for
Such a decision might be applicable when dealing
the provisions."
with those states granting occupancy rights to certain types of utilities
without any provision for regulation. However, it would appear that
all of these potential hurdles can be cleared and that these enactments
can form the basis for compliance with any new regulations without
amendment or supplement. Of course, such a statement must always
be premised on the supposition that the regulations will be reasonable.
However, if such were not the case, they could be attacked at the
federal level as well. 9 Further, if the suggested analysis of the Secretary's position is correct the regulations would not appear to be unreasonable, particularly with a provision added for the "hard cases" and
off-shoulder occupancy.
57. See PA. CONST. art. III, § 3.
58. Evans v. West Norristown Twp., 370 Pa. 150, 87 A2d 474 (1952); Commonwealth ex rel. Lyons v. Day, 177 Pa. Super. 392, 110 A.2d 871 (1952) ; WilkesBarre v. Pennsylvania P.U.C., 164 Pa. Super. 210, 63 A.2d 452 (1949).
59. C.I.R. v. Clark, 202 F.2d 94 (7th Cir. 1953) ; Hygrade Food Products Corp.
v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 196 F.2d 738 (1952).
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III.
CONTROLLED-ACCESS

LEGISLATION.

There are four significant things to remember about this type of
legislation:
1. It is found in one form or another in every state of the
union;
2. The impetus for its enactment or the revision and codification of existing access legislation was the federal provision for
access control and the prohibition against roadside establishments
for serving motorists;
3. It has two aspects of control, the limitation of access and
in some states the control of commercial establishments;
4. If the former applies at all to utility occupancy, it applies
only to the question of utilization of the main way as a service
road to adjacent facilities. On the other hand, in states having the
"commercial enterprise" prohibition, if that prohibition applies at
all, it means an absolute prohibition against utility occupancy of
any part of the right-of-way of a road designated as "controlled
access." Obviously, the courts are going to require some rather
clear expression of legislative intent before construing these provisions in that manner in the light of the long-standing permission
to occupy and the statutory duty to serve the public. 1
Much of this legislation is of recent origin, having been occasioned,
as noted, by the 1956 Federal-Aid Highway Act provision mentioned.
Specifically, that Act provides that all agreements between the Secretary
of Commerce and the various state highway departments for construction of projects on the Interstate System shall contain a clause providing
that the states will not add any points of access to, or exit from the
project except for those approved by the Secretary in plans for the
project, without prior approval of the Secretary. This same section
requires a clause in all such agreements prohibiting "automotive service
stations or other commercial establishments for serving motor vehicle
users to be constructed or located on the right of way of the Interstate
System." "

Consequently, there followed a wave of state legislation on the
subject, although one doubts if such was necessary in the light of the
"acceptance of aid" provisions then existing in all states. However,
the stimulus for specific legislation was no doubt the fact that this legislation had a decided impact upon private, vested, property rights-the
60. See
question.

APPENDIX

B of this Article for all state statutes dealing with this

61. Pennsylvania Electric Co. v. Morrison, 354 Pa. 472, 47 A.2d 810 (1946);
Borough of Ambridge v. Public Service Commission, 108 Pa. Super. 298, 165 Atl.
47 (1933).

62. See note 11 supra.
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abutting owner's right of access, recognized at common law."' Contrast
that with the equally well-established but non-vested utility license to
occupy the highways and you see why there is not the same need for
public legislation to meet reasonable conditions.
These statutes designate controlled-access highways by various
titles, the most common being "controlled-access facility," and "limitedaccess facility." In spite of the wide range of names the vast majority
are substantially similar to the Model Act which was drawn up to cover
this subject. The Model Act provides as follows:
"Sec. 2. Definition of a controlled-access facility. For the
purposes of this act, a controlled-access facility is defined as a highway or street especially designed for through traffic, and over, from,
or to which owners or occupants of abutting land or other persons
have no right or easements or only a controlled right or easement
of access, light, air, or view by reason of the fact that their property abuts upon such controlled-access facility or for any other
reason. Such highways or streets may be freeways open to use by
all customary forms of street and highway traffic; or they may be
parkways from which trucks, busses, and other commercial vehicles shall be excluded." "
It is obvious upon reading the act that the issue for purposes of
this discussion on, the access-control phase of these statutes is simply
whether or not utilities are "owners or occupants of abutting lands or
other persons" within the access prohibitions of the act. It would
appear that they are not.
This phrase is frequently used in statutory language and has
become a word of art. It is usually construed as including owners of
The "other persons" refers to asabutting land or their tenants."
signees, adverse possessors, squatters and the like who are in active
possession without property rights. Since the utilities occupy the highways under a license they are certainly not "owners." And equally so
they are not "occupants" as that phrase has come to be known. The
usual definition is found in Quist v. Duda, 6 in which Chief Justice
Simmons of Nebraska defined an "occupant" as:
"One who occupies; an inhabitant; especially one in actual possession, as a tenant, who has actual possession, in distinction from
the landlord who has legal or constructive possession."
63. Cunnyngham, The Limited-Access Highway From a Lawyer's Viewpoint,

13 Mo. L. Rxv. 19, 22 (1948); LEVIN, PUBLIC CONTROL OF HIGHWAY AccEsS AND
ROADSIDE DEVELOPMENT 1-98 (1947) ; Kane v. Metropolitan Elev. Ry. Co., 125 N.Y.
164, 26 N.E. 278 (1891) ; Egerer v. New York Central & H.R.R. Co., 130 N.Y. 108,
29 N.E. 95 (1891).
64. See Levin, op. cit. supra, note 63 at the Appendix A.
65. Leone v. Bilyear, 361 Mo. 974, 238 S.W.2d 317 (1951) ; Bixler v. Hagan,
42 Mo. 367 (1868) ; Quist v. Duda, 159 Neb. 393, 67 N.W.2d 481 (1954).
66. 159 Neb. 393, 67 N.W.2d 481 (1954).
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There is significance to be attached to the reference to inhabitant
and tenancy, as well as the statutory reference in these limited access statutes to the deprivation of the right of access, light, air or view.
All of these obviously are concerned with vested occupancy of an abutting dwelling. In fact one of the important legal questions surrounding
this type of legislation has been whether or not such an owner or
occupant has a right to redress for the loss of these common-law,
vested rights, 7 and whether such legislation is constitutional if provision is not made for compensation for the loss of these rights.0 8 But
none of these important signposts point in any way to utility occupancy.
Further, and significantly, the federal provision which gave impetus
to this legislation does not apply to utility access and this is best shown
by reason of the Secretary's statement with respect to a need for
such legislation in the future. 9 Hence, it is apparent that neither Congress nor the state legislatures were addressing themselves to this
question in enacting this legislation.
Finally, and of greatest significance, the very fact that access to
the highway is being controlled is the clearest indication that such
legislation is addressed only to the question of a crossing of that intangible line which separates the adjacent or abutting properties from
the highway right of way. Since the off-shoulder areas are part of the
highway it would be incongruous to control access to the same highway
by parties who are already on it and hence are not required to cross that
intangible line which designates the point of access.
In addition to the access prohibition eight statutes contain a prohibition against "commercial enterprise or activities" in some form or
other.7 ° The additional issue in those states is whether or not a public
utility is a "commercial enterprise or activity" within the meaning of
these statutes. The answer again appears to be no. This issue is not
present in Maine and Georgia which have the prohibition but have
worded it so as to specifically preclude any possible association of utility
facilities with the term "commercial enterprise." 71
As a matter of interpretation it is equally clear that utilities are
not contemplated by the New Mexico, Tennessee and Vermont
statutes 72 as they are all addressed to "competitive commercial establishments for serving motor vehicle users," which is virtually identical
with the language of the 1956 Federal-Aid Act, and obviously does not
67. See note 63 supra.
68. The Pennsylvania Act was declared unconstitutional on that very ground,

Creasy v. Stevens, 160 F. Supp. 404 (C.W.D. Pa. 1958).

69. See note 12 supra.

70. Georgia, Maine, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Pennsyl-

vania, Tennessee, and Vermont.
71. See APPENDIX B.
72. Ibid.
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refer to utility establishments.

The states not having such provisions

comply with this federal condition by virtue 'of the powers given by
statute to the administrator. That raises the question of just what the
states having the prohibition are seeking to exclude. The answer is
"ribbon development," and this is well illustrated by a dramatic portrayal of just what happens to a major roadway when there is no such
prohibition.

In .an article appearing in the Maryland Law Review " Robert
R. Bowie pointed up the need for these prohibitions as follows:
"The thread of commercial exploitation along the newly completed Ritchie and Philadelphia highways has recently focused
public attention on the problems of unrestricted roadside development, but the problem itself is not new. For many years, as
traffic has increased, the blight of such development has spread
unimpeded along the main traffic arteries of the State. Gasoline
stations, lunch rooms, stores, dance-halls, billboards and other
commercial establishments have multiplied until in extreme cases,
such as the Baltimore-Washington Boulevard, they stretched
practically in unbroken series along the whole length of the highway."
That is the kind of "commercialism" that these statutes are trying
to curb. To equate a state-franchised, highly regulated public utility
having a statutory duty to provide service to the public with a hot dog
stand is an intention that has never been attributed to a legislature.
This brings us to an analysis of the Pennsylvania and New Hampshire enactments " which have no qualifying language attached to
their prohibition against "commercialism." In New Hampshire there
is a dictum from an advisory opinion which casts some light on that
statute. Section 8 of the New Hampshire Limited-Access Highway
Act forbids the authorization of "commercial enterprises or activities"
on limited-access highways.7" In an Opinion of the Justices " the
question propounded to the Justices related to the constitutionality of
an amendment allowing established business facilities, abutting or
having direct access upon a newly designated limited-access highway,
to retain locations and access when it became a toll-free limited access
highway, and denying all rights of access to neighboring abutting
owners who had not so developed their land. The Justices were of
the opinion that such alleged discrimination was authorized by the
It is note73. Bowie, Limiting Highway Access, 4 MD. L. REV. 219 (1940).
worthy that Mr. Levin, Professor Huber, and all the other writers who analyzed
the reasons leading to this legislation, never considered utilities as causing these
problems. The cause was always attributed to "ribbon development."
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. 99 N.H. 505, 105 A.2d 924 (1954).
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amendment to the access act, and that it was constitutional because
it was reasonably related to the valid public purpose of preventing
further spread of such development. Of importance for this discussion
is the fact that the court in so holding, gave some indication that
they considered the commercial prohibition as applying to the ribbon
type development. The language in question reads as follows:
"A further question may be thought to be presented as to
whether the provisions of [the amendment] . . . necessarily
produce an unconstitutional discrimination against the owners of
properties which abut the toll-free section of the limited access
highway, but have not been developed into going business establishments and will be deprived of rights of access, air, light or
view, upon establishment of the turnpike . .. .
The Justices then pointed out that the advisory opinion was not
binding upon the question of vested rights possessed by the abutting
owners. Although far from a choice case, it associates, by implication,
in the court's mind, the "ribbon" type of abutting "business establishments" and vested property interests with limited-access legislation.
It is also worthy of mention that no public utility joined with the dissenting group of intervenors who feared that their rights might be affected by the advisory opinion.
Since the language of the Pennsylvania statute is virtually identical, this same reasoning could be applied to that enactment. Further,
and like New Hampshire's, the Pennsylvania Act provides for the establishment of local service roads; it then goes on to say that these
roads should be located so as to permit the establishment "of adequate
fuel and other service facilities for the users of the limited-access highway." This sentence is then followed by the prohibition against commercial enterprises and activities. This indicates that the prohibition
is referring to the same type of business as that narrowly excepted in
the prior sentence. That interpretation becomes more persuasive when
it is considered that both provisos are found in the same section of the
Act. A logical interpretation in the light of the rules of statutory construction, and the comprehensive Pennsylvania utility regulatory
scheme found in other acts, is that the legislature first provided for the
necessary off-the-road gasoline, dining, and rest facilities because it was
going to exclude similar enterprises from the traveled portion of the
right-of-way in the very next sentence.
When it is again considered that the impetus for such legislation
was the wave of ribbon development and the federal prohibition against
commercial establishments, there is little doubt that this provision was
not meant to apply to utilities and should not be used to prevent the
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Commonwealth from complying with the new federal conditionsprevent, advisedly, because the regulations suggested by Secretary
Weeks " clearly contemplate the use of the right of way for utility installations, within the limits of access control. Further, an examination
of some of the case-law definitions of "commercial enterprise" emphasizes that the term "utility facility" connotates industrial rather
than business or commercial development.78 Even that title is not quite
descriptive-in a word, public service companies are a class by themselves and are usually referred to specifically when enacting permissive
or restrictive legislation applicable to them. This is shown by the
specific enabling acts; the specific utility regulation provisions in state
highway laws and the fact that in zoning legislation utility facilities
are invariably
are not placed in any of the usual classifications but
79
specifically prohibited or permitted in a given zone.
With respect to case-law definitions of the phrase most of the
decisions make no distinction between the words "commercial enterprise" and "commercial activity." 80 The courts use the terms interchangeably without identifying one or the other with a particular individual definition.
Most of the Pennsylvania cases involving an interpretation of the
phrase arise over the question of eligibility for the charitable-institution tax exemption,8 ' and hence are not direct authority. In spite of
the long-standing legal maxim that tax exemptions are to be strictly
construed the courts have given a narrow definition to the words,
thus enabling many activities which are clearly of a business nature
to come within the tax exemption by labelling them as non-commercial
2
enterprises. For example, in Y. M. C. A. of Pittsburgh Tax Case,
the court held that the "Y" was not a "commercial activity" in spite of
the fact that it conducted in the same building with the dormitories, a
restaurant, food service center, bowling alleys, barber shops and
businessmen's health clubs. Contrast that with a public utility which is
77. See note 12 supra.
78. See Littlehales v. District of Columbia, 130 F.2d 402, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1942)
(used terms "business" and "commercial activity" interchangeably) ; District of
Columbia v. Wardell, 12 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (used terms "business" and
"commercial activity" interchangeably) ; Jones v. Johnson, 55 S.E.2d 904, 906 (Ga.
1949) (words "commercial purposes" identified with sale of goods and merchandise) ;
Murdoch v. City of Norwood, 67 N.E.2d 867, 869 (Ohio 1946) (word "business"
associated with retail establishments) ; Jones v. Rezzetono, 92 Pgh. L.J. 369 (C.P.
Ally. 1944) (auto-body shop not commercial).
79. See, for example, City of Philadelphia Zoning Laws of 1957.
80. See Plumby v. Philadelphia School District, 182 Pa. Super. 122, 126 A.2d
678 (1956) ; Philadelphia Suburban Water Co. v. Pennsylvania P.U.C., 168 Pa. Super.
360, 78 A.2d 46 (1951).
81. See West Indies Mission Appeal, 387 Pa. 534, 128 A.2d 773 (1957) ; Y.M.C.A.
of Pittsburgh Tax Case, 383 Pa. 176, 117 A.2d 743 (1955).
82. 383 Pa. 176, 117 A.2d 743 (1955).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1958

25

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 4 [1958], Art. 4
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 3: p. 489

restricted in its financial and accounting methods to a prescribed system of accounts; restricted in its contractual powers by a regulatory
commission's passing upon virtually all its agreements; and finally and
foremost, its inability to put a price tag on its cost of service which is
arrived at by virtue of the rate-making process; and you see that even
the "Y" has more extensive business-type aspects than a utility.
Finally, in addition to the usual constitutional question surrounding the limitation on access which has recently resulted in an invalidation of this act, on that ground, such an interpretation would
raise serious constitutional questions in Pennsylvania since the title of
the act has no reference whatsoever to any prohibitions against "commercial enterprise" or any regulatory or exclusionary features whatsoevery It would also encounter difficulties on the question of duality
of subject matter.84 In addition, it would constitute an implied amendment to all the utility enabling acts without any notice in the title.85
Hence, in the light of all the factors discussed it would be somewhat astonishing if any court would interpret such a provision as applying to
utilities.
IV.
CONCLUSION.

The purpose of this article was to determine if amendments or
supplements to state laws would be necessary in order to carry out the
mandate of anticipated federal regulation with respect to utility installation on the Interstate Highway System. The answer is "no," so
long as the regulations follow the pattern set forth in the article. If the
regulations follow the predicted form the states have two hooks to
hang their hats on-the comprehensive utility regulatory and enabling
acts found in all states and the assent to federal-aid conditions which
have also been enacted by all 48 states. The latter class of legislation is
simple, all inclusive, and elastic, and would appear to be a most desirable method of making any adjustments in existing state policy with
respect to the question of occupancy by utility facilities. It is highly
improbable that the access provisions of state controlled access legislation
could be utilized for this purpose. And it is even more improbable that
the commercial enterprise provisions found in several states could be
utilized in any way in restricting or excluding utilities.
83. See Act of May 29, 1945 Pub. L. No. 1108. Also see footnote 68 supra.
Apparently the entire Act was declared invalid in spite of the separability clause on
the theory the Legislature would not want it to stand with the backbone of the Act
being unconstitutional, at least with respect to the fact situation presented.
84. See Stewart v. Hadley, 327 Pa. 66, 74, 193 Atl. 41 .(1937) ; Wilkes-Barre v.
Pennsylvania P.U.C., 164 Pa. Super. 210, 63 A.2d 452 (1949).
85. Ridge Avenue Pass. Ry. Co. v. Philadelphia, 124 Pa. 219, 16 Atl. 741 (1889)
Wilkes-Barre v. Pennsylvania P.U.C., 164 Pa. Super. 210, 63 A.2d 452 (1949);
Commonwealth ex rel. Reno v. Heidelberg Twp., 48 D & C 511 (C.P. Dauph. 1943).
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APPENDIX A
Assent to Federal Aid Legislation

State
Alabama ................... ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 23, § 32.
Arizona .................... ARIz. CODE ANN. § 18-106(5), (7) and (15).
Arkansas ................... ARK. STAT. § 76-522.
California .................. CAL. STREETS & H'WAYS CODE § 820 (West).
Colorado ................... COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 112.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 2260.
Connecticut ................
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 17, § 422.
Delaware ...................
Florida .................... FLA. STAT. ANN. § 339.02.
Georgia .................... GA. CODE ANN. § 1618.
Idaho ......................

IDAHO CODE ANN. tit. 40-2401, § 2.
C. 121, §§257-265, 292 (Smith-Hurd).
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 36-127, 2953.
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 307.6, 307.7, 310.1(4), 310.2, 313.1.
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-7.

Illinois ..................... ILL. ANN. STAT.
Indiana ....................
Iowa .......................

Kansas .....................
Kentucky ................... Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 176.240.
Louisiana .................. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 48:161, 48:164, 48:203.
Maine

.....................

ME. REv. STAT. ANN. c. 23, §§ 15, 17, 18.
ANN. CODE art. 89B, § 76(1), (2).

Maryland ................... MD.
Massachusetts ..............
Michigan ..................
Minnesota ..................

MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 81, §§ 29A, 30.
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.831.
MINN. STAT. ANN. C. 160, § 160.12.

Mississippi ................. MIss. CODE ANN. §8038(s).
Missouri

...................

Montana ...................
Nebraska ...................
Nevada ....................
New Hampshire ............
New Jersey ................
New Mexico ...............
New York .................
North Carolina .............
North Dakota ...............
Ohio .......................
Oklahoma ..................
Oregon ....................
Pennsylvania ...............
Rhode Island ...............
South Carolina .............
South Dakota ..............
Tennessee ..................
Texas ......................
Utah .......................
Vermont ...................
Virginia ....................
Washington ...............
West Virginia ..............
Wisconsin ..................
Wyoming ..................

Mo. STAT. ANN. § 226.190.
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 32-1606,
LEGISLATIVE BILL 187, §§ 4, 5.
NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 408.245, 408.250.

32-1609.

N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§239:1, 239:6.
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§27:8-1, 27:8-6, 27:12B-5.
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-3-19, 55-3-20, 55-2-20, 55-2-26.
N.Y. STREETS & H'wAYs Bk. 24, art. IV, § 80.
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 136-35, 136-18(1)
N.D. REv. CODE § 24-0401.
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5531.02.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 30.1, 43(d).
ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 11.402, 406, 407, 412, 615.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §§ 670-1005, 670-1006.
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. C. 75, § 29.
S.C. CODE § 33-2.

S.D.

CODE

§ 28.0201.

TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 54-301, 54-302.
TEx. REv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 6674(d), 6672.
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 27-5-1-27-5-4.
VT. STAT. 5004-10.
VA. CODE ANN. §§33-12(5), 33-130.
WASH. REv. CODE c. 47.04, 47.050.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 1455.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 84.-5.
Wyo. COMP. STAT. ANN. §48-109.
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APPENDIX B
State Controlled Access Legislation
State
Alabama

Controlled Designation
Access
for Controlled Commercial
Legislation Highways Prohibition

Yes

Limited Access

No

Statute

, ALA. CODE

ANN. tit.

36, § 1.

Highway

Arizona

Yes

Arkansas

Controlled
Access Highway

No

ARIZ.

Yes

Controlled
Access Facility

No

California

Yes

Freeway

No

Colorado

Yes

Freeway

No

Connecticut

Yes

Parkways &
Freeways

No

Delaware

Yes

Controlled
Access Highway

No

Florida

Yes

Limited Access
Facility

No

Georgia

Yes

Limited Access
Highway

Yes

Idaho

Yes

Controlled
Access Facility

No

Illinois

Yes

Expressway;
Superhighway

No

Indiana

Yes

Limited Access
Facility

No

Iowa

Yes

Controlled
Access Facility

No

Kansas

Yes

Controlled
Access Facility

No

LAWS OF KANSAS
LAWS OF KANSAS

Kentucky

Yes

Limited Access
Facility

No

Ky.

Louisiana

Yes

Limited Access
Facility

No

LA. REV. STAT. § 313.

Maine

Yes

Controlled
Access Highway

Yes

ME. REV. STAT. c. 23,

Maryland

Yes

Controlled
No
Access Arterial
Highway; Freeway

MD. ANN. CODE

REv.

STAT. ANN. vol.

9,

§ 28-602.
§ 76-2203-10.

ARK. STAT. ANN.
CAL.

STREETS

&

H'WAYS

§§ 24, 100.1-3 (West).

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. C.

§ 144.
CONN. GEN. STAT. tit.

CODE

143,

16, c. 107,

§ 2257(b) ; c. 143, § 144.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 17, §§ 171179.
FLA.
STAT. ANN.
§§ 338.01338.21, 334.03 (9).
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 95-1701a, 951702a, 95-1707a.
IDAHO CODE ANN. tit. 40-110,
§ 133; tit. 40-2610.
ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 34, § 57p
(Smith-Hurd).
IND. ANN. STAT. § 36-3102.
IowA

CODE

§§306A.1-

ANN.

306A.9.

REV.

STAT.

1957, § 5.
1953, c. 307.
§§ 177.010-

177.380.

§ 9.

art. 89B, § 32,

33, 165.

Massachusetts

Yes

Limited Access
Highway

No

MASS. ANN. LAWS § 81:7c.

Michigan

Yes

No

MicH. CoMp. LAWS
MICH. STAT. ANN.

Minnesota

Yes

No

MINN. LAWS OF

Mississippi

Yes

No

Miss. CODE ANN. c. 314, § 1819.

Missouri

Yes

Limited Access
Highway
Controlled
Access Highway
Controlled
Access Facility
No Term-General
Power Over
Highways is
Broad Enough

No

Mo.
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Controlled Designation
for Controlled Camnmercial
Access
Statute
Legislation Highways Prohibition
State
No
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 32Controlled
Yes
Montana
2001-2010, 32-1625.
Access Highway
LEGIS. BiLL 187-1955, § 27-35.
No
Controlled
Yes
Nebraska
Access Facility
LAWS OF NEv. 1955 c. 86, AsNo
Limited Access
Yes
Nevada
sembly #247.
Highway
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 236.8,
Yes
Limited Access
New Hampshire Yes
236.1.
Facility
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:4-90.1,
No
Limited Access
Yes
New Jersey
39:4-94.1.
Highway
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-10-1Yes
Controlled
Yes
New Mexico
55-10-10.
Access Facility
N.Y. STRs & H'wAYs Bk.
Controlled Access No
Yes
New York
24, §§3(2), 346.
Highway; Thruway
N.C. SEss. LAWS c. 993.
Yes
Controlled
Yes
North Carolina
Access Facility

N.D. REv. CODE §§24-0130,
24A-0102(9).
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. tit. 25,
§ 5511.02.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47,
§ 121.1 (s) ; tit. 69, § 11.1.

North Dakota

Yes

Controlled
Access Facility

No

Ohio

Yes

Limited Access
Highway

No

Oklahoma

Yes

Limited Access
Highway Facility

No

Oregon

Yes

Thruway

No

ORE.

Pennsylvania

Yes

Yes

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §§ 239.1

Rhode Island
South Carolina

Yes

Limited Access
Highway
Freeway

Yes

Controlled
Access Facility

No

South Dakota

Yes

No

S.D. SESS. LAWS 1953 H.B.
656.

Tennessee

Yes

Controlled
Access Facility
Controlled
Access Facility

Yes

TENN. CODE ANN. vol. 10,

Texas

Yes

Controlled
Access Highways

No

TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.

Utah

Yes

No

UTAH CODE ANN. vol. 3-27-9-1.

Vermont

Yes

Yes

VT. LAWS 1955 c. 270,

Virginia

Yes

No

VA. CODE ANN. vol. 6, §§ 33-

Washington

Yes

No

WASH. REV. CODE

West Virginia

Yes

Limited Access
Facility
Limited Access
Facility
Limited Access
Highway
Limited Access
Facility
Controlled
Access Facility

No

W. VA. CODE ANN.

Wisconsin

Yes

Wyoming

Yes

Controlled
Access Highway
Access Facility

No

REv.

STAT.

374.030, 374.305.

§§ 374.010,

-2391.6.
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. c. 75.
S.C. CODE vol. 4, § 33-351.

§ 54-2001-54-2009.
6674W-1.

§ 11.

37, 33-40.

§§ 47.52.010,

47.52.040.

§§ 1474(23)

(21), 1721(283).
No

Wis. LAWS vol. 1-1955, c. 270.

No

WYo. COMP. STAT. ANN.

§§ 48-

346-48-356.
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